

SECRET

D/OP




EXCOM 82-7039
30 August 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM : Executive Assistant to the DDCI
SUBJECT : Long Range HUMINT Planning Objectives Paper
for 1 September EXCOM Meeting

Attached is a revised paper on HUMINT Planning Objectives for
the 1 September Executive Committee Meeting. Other than numbered
pages, the only changes are on page 7 (III. Cover) and page 10

25X1




25X1

Attachment

Distribution:

- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - ExDir
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - DDA
- 1 - DDS&T
- 1 - DDO
- 1 - Comptroller
- 1 - D/OP
- 1 - Acting IG
- 1 - Planning Staff
- 1 - ER via ES
- 1 - EXCOM Chrono w/o att
- 1 - EXCOM Agenda w/o att
- 1 - EA/DDCI

SECRET



25X1

LONG RANGE HUMINT PLANNING OBJECTIVES

I. OVERVIEW

A. The intelligence challenges outlined in Phase II demand that we increase our HUMINT capabilities to meet new requirements while maintaining and improving our capabilities to work against our traditional requirements for intelligence on long-standing targets.


B. Despite already identified new challenges and the virtual certainty that both more new targets and unforeseen changes in our operational environment will arise in the coming decade, the basic elements of HUMINT operations will not change. Our trade will always involve employing exceptionally talented and well trained people who must have good cover, foreign language competence, technical support and management support to meet, recruit, and exploit human sources of intelligence. Our planning objectives, therefore, must aim at improvements in these basic elements of HUMINT operations: People, Cover, Training, Technical Support, and Management. The following outlines a strategy for the Directorate of Operations to enhance each of these basic elements. Since these are also the basic building blocks for Counterintelligence and Covert Action operations, our HUMINT long range planning strategy will be one which aims at enhancement of the Directorate's capability to fulfill all of its missions.

25X1
25X1 C. This paper is an outline of potential enhancements in the basic elements of HUMINT collection. It envisions a possible restructuring of many DO field stations and calls for an increase of approximately [] case officer positions abroad. (The Directorate earlier had submitted plans for an increase of approximately [] case officer positions during the period FY 83-88.) It also presents in the attachment, long range prospects and plans for each of the intelligence targets.

SECRET

25X1

II. PEOPLE



A. Acquisition: We are still attracting enough high quality personnel to meet current needs for both Operations Officer and support personnel. The significant increase in our total strength which is called for in this plan will require that we generate far more applicants and greatly streamline our selection process. The basic processes of generating applications and the basic requirements of the selection process, however, are not subject to much change. We will still have to rely on advertising and referrals from persons both aware of our needs and familiar with numbers of potential applicants. We cannot allow the pressure to fill positions to lower our standards. Nor can we eliminate the basic elements of the screening process. Enhancements, therefore, must come from a constant search for incremental improvements in our current recruitment procedures. Some areas which may offer potential improvements are:

25X1



2. A "CIA ROTC": The probability of continued escalation in the costs of higher education and likelihood that public assistance for the payment of these costs will decrease could pose problems for our recruitment as fewer young people may be able to afford educations that would qualify them for careers in HUMINT. It could, however, offer opportunity as well. We should examine the potential of a program, similar to military ROTC, in which CIA would fund undergraduate or graduate programs to highly qualified students who would commit themselves to a minimum period of

SECRET

25X1 employment with CIA following completion of their education. There would be obvious cover and administrative problems, but these probably could be overcome. One area for examination would be [REDACTED]

3. More "Mustangs": Our current and future pools of technical and clerical support personnel should be systematically reviewed to find persons with potential for development for HUMINT collection careers. CIA financing of university level education for high-potential young people in support positions should be considered as a means of developing HUMINT professionals.

B. Development

25X1 1. A "Holistic" Personnel Approach for the Directorate of Operations: The basic personality and interpersonal skills that make a good Clandestine Services Officer are also required of an effective [REDACTED] Both jobs involve the basic work of persuading human beings to provide information and or services to the U.S. Government. [REDACTED] extremely valuable contributions to the Clandestine Service in operational leads and other operational support has demonstrated the validity of merging the CS and [REDACTED] into the same Directorate as well as the need for interaction and, ideally, exchange of personnel between these two elements of the Operations Directorate. Within the CS, it is important that we not permit increased attention to Covert Action and valid concern for our Counterintelligence posture to blur the basic reality that intelligence collection, counterintelligence, and covert action are interwoven activities in the practice of clandestine operations. Effective HUMINT collection can't not be accomplished without effective concern for counterintelligence considerations and effective application of counterintelligence skills. [REDACTED]

25X1 [REDACTED]

25X1

2. Training: Our current program provides outstanding basic training for Operations Officers. Our future plans for operations training should aim at improvements in this already effective system. We must, however, develop means to ensure that mid-career, operational management and other post-basic training programs are used throughout the careers of operations personnel. In the coming decade and beyond we will need to expand significantly our foreign language training and to develop programs to

We also need to rebuild the Directorate's cadre of area experts, especially for areas such as the Third World. We see the following as offering potential for enhancement of our training capability:

a. General Training Resources: The need for more training in languages, specialized skills, and better management of operations and resources, will require that we plan to devote approximately 20% of the careers of Operations Officers to training. It is also essential to ensure that our best people are assigned to the operational training function, perhaps by making identification for executive development or some other highly selective criterion a requirement for posting to a training position. We, of course, will require an increase in our total complement to enable us to make this personnel investment.

b. Operational Courses: The training of Operations Officers requires the heavy investment of experienced personnel.

25X1

[REDACTED]

We need to plan for the assignment of enough Operations Officers to the training function to meet these twin needs of training itself and the constant upgrading of the training program. We must also plan a total personnel complement that will permit periodic and mandatory advanced operational training and management training for all Operations Officers throughout their careers.

c. Language Training: Although language proficiency is now listed in the promotion precepts for Operations Officers, we should plan now for a personnel system under which no Operations Officer can receive more than two promotions above the Officer's entry grade without intermediate proficiency in at least one foreign language. We should also plan to fund a significant expansion in our current language incentive program.

[REDACTED]

e. Rotations: Cross-utilization of personnel between the Directorates should be used extensively as a device to provide well trained personnel for collection operations. Placing Operations Officers in other components will provide experience that will give those Officers essential collection skills. The use of other Directorates' analysts and experts in technical, financial, and administrative fields as Operations Officers for a tour or more would provide a pool of ready-made expertise with full understanding of the Intelligence Process and ability to absorb rapidly the operational training needed to field these experts as HUMINT collectors.

C. Retention: The retention of CIA Operations Officers has not been a serious difficulty in the past. We can expect that the challenges, sense of professional pride, and feelings of accomplishment will continue to be important factors in keeping operational personnel in the clandestine service. There are serious

~~SECRET~~

problems, however, which we will need to address to prevent economic factors from affecting our retention of quality personnel.

1. We should continue and increase our efforts to accommodate the professional employment of spouses of operational personnel, both in the Agency and outside it overseas and in the domestic field. Economic trends, which appear unlikely to change, are making it necessary for both spouses in a marriage to work in order to maintain a middle class lifestyle. We are already confronted with situations in which officers are refusing field assignments because they are locked into mortgages and other financial commitments which they could not meet without the continued income of spouses employed in professional level jobs in the Headquarters area. It is no longer the case that overseas allowances and lower overseas living costs make up for the loss of the income of an employed spouse. We should work with the Foreign Service and other agencies, such as the FBI, who require mobility of their personnel, on a continuing basis, over the coming decade and beyond to develop ways to overcome the financial costs of field assignments.

2. We should develop a CIA personnel and pay system that is entirely separate from the Civil Service. The need for this separation is rooted in the history of government in the U.S.. Prior to the Great Depression and World War II, the public perceived government, at all levels, to be made up of two classes of persons: politicians (both elected and appointed policy makers) and clerks. The body politic experienced variations in the quality of service it obtained from both of these classes, but still recognized a need for both. In the past half century, however, the profession of "public administration" has developed a third class of public servants, government managers, who became what Evans and Novak have labeled the "governing class". Pay scales and the organization of the Civil Service throughout the 1930's, 40's, 50's and 60's gave this "governing class" incomes and benefits which allowed its members to establish secure middle class existences. In the 1980's, unfortunately, this class of civil servants, who occupy the jobs at roughly the GS-11 to GS-15 level in the Civil Service, perform functions which, however valuable they may in fact be, are not perceived as necessary by the body politic. The result, in the coming decade when much of the population of the U.S. will almost certainly undergo painful economic adjustments, will be growing political pressures to divest the "governing class" of much of its gains from the preceding fifty years. The uniformed military services and the Foreign

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Service have effectively separated themselves from the "governing class" and already have avoided early stages of the reduction in the benefits of that class. The military and Foreign Service, for example, have obtained significant pay increases while the Civil Service has been held to raises which, because they are well short of inflation, have resulted in losses of real income over the past several years. Growing pressure from Congress to place government workers under the Social Security system, rather than the far more advantageous Civil Service Retirement, is another example of the pressures on the "governing class" from which the military and Foreign Service have been exempted. The need for CIA to distance itself similarly from the Civil Service was demonstrated in Congressional reaction to our overseas pay differential. Although this measure was, in fact, an attempt to redress part of the gap between the compensation levels of CIA personnel and Foreign Service personnel, it was perceived by Congress as an effort by part of the Civil Service (the "GS people") to undo Congressional efforts to correct earlier shortfalls in Foreign Service pay when compared to that of the "governing class". A CIA pay and personnel system that is fully and visibly different from that of the Civil Service, including separation from the General Scale salary tables, will be needed for CIA to avoid the coming reductions in Civil Service benefits. Failure to separate CIA from these reductions would have serious effects on our ability to retain quality personnel in the coming decade and beyond. Perhaps even more important than the economic factor in this need for separation from the Civil Service would be the morale factor in the need for CIA personnel to be separate from the "governing class" which is not now perceived as the kind of elite in which our people all need to feel membership.

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

IV. TECHNICAL SUPPORT

Technical systems are essential to the Directorate of Operations both as tools used in collection, counterintelligence and covert action operations and as management tools. In our planning strategy for the coming decade and beyond, we can count on continued requirements for the operational support provided by the Office of Technical Services and for continuing and growing needs for information management and other (primarily computer) management tools.

A. Technical Systems Used as Operational Tools

The Office of Technical Services now develops and produces technical systems, in the following generic areas, for use as operational tools in HUMINT operations.



25X1

6. Behavioral Analysis systems are important tools in helping to determine the vulnerabilities, motivations and talents, as well as the veracity of potential and active human sources. There will be a continuing need for systems and techniques of this sort.

Support provided to the Clandestine Service in all of these areas has been an important element in past successes. Continuation of this record of valuable support will require planning for the most effective use of our resources. Our strategy for enhancing each of these areas of technical support should concentrate on exploiting and adapting existing technology in the development of technical systems to support HUMINT collection operations, rather than efforts to use CIA resources to advance technology to create

systems that are beyond current "state of the art." Our future enhancement efforts therefore should involve:

1. Close and continuing dialogue between the developers and expected users of new and improved systems. At regular intervals in the design process, operations officers should be called in to consider the practicality of and possible improvements in the system under development. There must also be institutionalized reviews at which developers and users search for points at which development projects with unexpected cost growth can be considered carefully for termination to avoid continuing investments in projects whose costs exceed their expected operational pay-offs.

2. Close and continuing attention to commercial and industrial development to search for new systems that can be adopted or adapted for clandestine use.

3. Critical and highly selective reviews of proposed and on-going development programs to ensure that resources are not placed in high-risk, high-cost development efforts at the expense of direct support for "bread and butter" technical support systems with wide and immediate applications in the field.

B. Enhancing Technical Systems Used as Management Tools

The Directorate of Operations has employed computer, telecommunications, micrographic, and word processing technologies extensively to facilitate its abundant information management tasks. While the Office of Data Processing has provided administrative computer systems to assist personnel, financial, and logistical management, [REDACTED]

We plan to enhance our capabilities by:

1. Extending computer and word processing technology to overseas and U.S. field stations, an initiative that has already begun. This should permit stations to maintain their record holdings in quickly-destroyable electronic form in anticipation of an emergency; it should bring efficiencies that will reduce the need for administrative and clerical assistance -

SECRET

freeing overseas positions for operations officers. Field computer equipment will connect with Headquarters data bases and with non-official cover officers' communications equipment as appropriate for accelerated and more secure information flow.

2. Extending data and word processing availability at Headquarters to all Directorate components. This will allow operations officers to compose, coordinate and transmit their outgoing messages; receive, analyze and disseminate their incoming messages; store and retrieve messages; and perform counterintelligence and other research in near-paperless electronic form, without the need for intermediaries. Labor intensive functions such as data entry, indexing, abstracting and text-searching will be handled automatically by computer. Improved compartmentation of sensitive operational information will be afforded through widespread use of small, dispersed word-processor/computers and through data encryption.

V. MANAGEMENT

HUMINT collection operations will continue, basically, to involve placing well trained, covered, and equipped operations officers close to potential sources and, then, recruiting and exploiting those sources. There are, however, limits on the improvements we can expect in the quality of new personnel, limits on the time and money that we can devote to training and career development to improve our personnel, limits on the cover we are likely to get from other Government agencies and the private sector, and limits on improvements that we can expect in technical systems. The greatest improvements in our capabilities are likely to come from improvements in the deployment and exploitation of finite resources; in short, from improvements in management.

We see potential for enhancement of our capabilities through improvements in the following areas of the management of HUMINT operations:

A. Interaction with other CIA elements:

1. The Directorate of Intelligence: The creation of or improvements in a close working relationship between the Directorates of Operations and Intelligence has been a goal of DCI's and of Deputy Directors for Operations and Intelligence throughout the history of the Agency. This relationship is better now than in the past. There are two areas in which significant improve-

SECRET

ments are possible. Fundamental improvements in these areas, in fact, will be essential if the information needs of the late 80's and the 90's are to be met. These needed improvements will be in the exchange of personnel between the Directorates and in the interplay between the Directorates in the process of formulating intelligence requirements.

a. The exchange of personnel: The Directorate of Operations, if properly manned, should be able to have more people on tours in the Headquarters area than will be needed for the Headquarters management of field operations. More of the careers of Operations personnel will have to be devoted to in-depth studies of target countries and of now esoteric fields such as international finance, developments in high technology, and strategic weapons. The Directorate of Intelligence, on the other hand, has noted its requirement for far more analytical personnel with language skills and overseas living experience. One opportunity for enhancement of capability which would arise from this situation is obvious. We should program a significant portion of the careers of operations officers for tours in the Directorate of Intelligence. Intelligence Directorate personnel, in significant numbers, should also be trained in operations, provided cover and assigned to operational tours overseas.

b. The Intelligence Requirements Process: Intelligence collectors learn quickly that good requirements yield good collection. The Directorates of Operations and Intelligence need to establish a closer relationship in the formulation of requirements for HUMINT, especially clandestine, collection. One thing that is clear in the Phase II enumeration of long range information needs is that they can not be filled without constant refinement of collection effort through close and continuing dialogue with the intelligence consuming analysts. Collectors will have to ensure that analysts are generally aware of the kinds of information that are likely to be available through HUMINT collection operations. Analysis should be used to provide guidance to collectors; such as the identification of institutions and individuals that are likely both to possess needed information, specific indicators of phenomena like political instability or nuclear weapons development, and for the training of operations officers in technical subjects which generalist field case officers are often unprepared to cover. Meteorology provides a useful analogy to illustrate an ideal requirements relationship between an analyst and collectors. The analyst, in this case the weatherman, studies the weather and determines that there are recurring

combinations of conditions that lead to precipitation and other combinations that lead to clear skies. On the basis of his study, the weatherman is able to levy refined requirements on his collectors. Instead of stating that he needs to know what the weather is, he asks for specific indicators such as temperature, humidity, wind direction, and cloud formations in the areas covered by his collectors. In addition, the weatherman is able, because of his analysis, to guide the collectors by informing them of the presence on the market or in government warehouses of collection aids like thermometers and hygrometers. In short, the interaction between the analyst and collector yields valuable efficiencies because analysis narrows the requirements to important indicators and provides guidance on the most productive collection means for the collectors.

B. Interaction With Other U.S. Government Agencies

1. The Department of State: The Department of State is an important consumer of intelligence information. We should systematically exploit the analytical capability and information base of the Department of State to provide the same sort of refinements to requirements and aids to operational planning that we need to seek from the Directorate of Intelligence. State is also an important source of information and support that will be needed to develop programs to seek improvements in compensation and other benefits which will be needed incentives to continue attracting high quality personnel for overseas service. We must continue and seek constantly for incremental improvements in our currently good relations with State. One area we should explore is that of personnel exchange. Our personnel, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

2. The FBI: We should also seek to develop a program under which FBI Agents are assigned to CIA for rotational tours, either overtly as counterintelligence specialists at Headquarters or, with proper training and cover, as Operations Officers on field assignments.

3. The Department of Defense: Defense interacts with CIA's HUMINT operations as:

a. Consumer: The Department of Defense, like the Directorate of Intelligence is a source of requirements which can

be refined to improve collection efforts and of analysis which can be used in the planning of collection operations.

b. Source of information [REDACTED]

25X1

The Department of Defense deals with, often trains and frequently hosts foreign military officials with important intelligence access and influence. Defense planners have amassed huge volumes of tactical information on most countries of the world. These data are valuable [REDACTED] Perhaps most important as a potential to enhance our capabilities is the vast collection capability of the worldwide American military presence.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

d. Complementary Collector: The Department of Defense is currently seeking to expand its own clandestine collection capability. We need a close and continuing relationship with the managers of present and future Defense elements engaged in clandestine operations, not only to ensure the quality of those operations, but to seek efficiencies that can be obtained through sharing of operational information, elimination of duplicative efforts, and, especially, possible exchanges of operational personnel. Our current liaison with Defense includes the mechanisms necessary to accomplish these aims. We need, however, to seek constantly for improvements.

C. Operational Management

1. The Current Management System: The Directorate of Operations now uses a system, tying evaluations of operational potential and production to the allocation of resources, which is sound. Improved automation in information management will provide opportunities to sharpen this management system. Current efforts underway to standardize and automate all Stations' reporting and recording of operational assets and activities are yielding efficiencies and making it easier for managers to track performance from year to year. Long range efforts should include continued pressure to find and implement incremental, but constant improvements in this system.

2. Exploitation of Field Assets

a. Agents: In general, we can expect improvement of our exploitation of agents to come through enhancements in the basic elements of clandestine operations. More and better qualified operations officers, with better cover and technical support, will be more productive agent handlers. We should, however, plan to use expected overall improvements in our operational capabilities to sharpen our management of agent operations. Improved managerial access, through enhanced computer capabilities, to the data base on our agents, for example, should be used to follow systematically the operational history of each recruited agent. The computer power which is beginning to be available now and will be in widespread use by the end of the decade provides target analysis and counterintelligence research capabilities beyond anything we have had in the past. This operational tracking system also can be used to evaluate the management of assets. Through tying reports of such history to the evaluations of officers involved in various operations, Operations Officers could be judged not only on recruitments and on relatively brief periods of exploitation of particular agents, but also on the performance, over long periods of time, of agents they have recruited or handled. The income of an insurance salesman, for example, rests largely on "residuals", the commissions from annual renewals of policies sold by the salesman years earlier. Evaluations of Operations Officers should, similarly, be based upon the continuing productivity of operations they have created or improved, rather than solely on the act of recruitment or frequently brief periods of case management.

25X1

b. Liaisons: Liaison relationships will continue as important:



25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

~~SECRET~~

C. USSR Economics

A successor leadership will have to cope almost immediately with severe economic problems. Thus the potential for sudden changes in policies requiring a U.S. response will be high.

25X1

~~SECRET~~

25X1


Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

SECRET

D. Eastern Europe

Endemic instability will have substantial implications for the United States--for a shift in the balance of power in Europe, for US-USSR relations, and for US relations with the NATO Allies. 25X1



SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8

Next 30 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2005/08/15 : CIA-RDP89-01114R000300040011-8